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Abstract
We investigate the two-stage competition in which two In-
ternet Service Providers chosse sequentially their capacities and
then their prices while facing a flow of new customers who decide
to belong to one ISP or the other on the basis of a compari-
son of access prices and of expected congestion rates . At the
equilibrium of the game a vertical diﬀerentiation between the In-
ternet Service Providers endogenously emerges: the firm which
provides the larger network has the lowest rate of congestion and
the highest access price. The I.S.P providing the smallest net-
work (thus the most congested) earns the larger profit. It will
be noticed that the spontaneous functioning of oligopolistic com-
petition produces a result similar to the Odlyzko’s "Paris Metro
Pricing": at the equilibrium the two competitors propose diﬀer-
ent prices and rates of congestion, the most expensive one being
also the least congested
L12, L13
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1 Introduction
In this paper we investigate the static competition in prices and capac-
ities between I.S.P which face a flow of new customers who decide to
belong to one I.S.P or the other on the basis of a comparison of access
prices and of congestion rates that they are supposed to anticipate in a
rational way.
The interesting specificity of the approach presented here is that the
level of quality of the service provided by an ISP depends not only on
the capacity of its network (this is the common point with the model
of Gabszewicz and Thisse) but also on the number of its customers
which are connected, i.e. on the deman which is addressed to him/her.
Since the latter, as we shall see below, is itself a function of the rate
of congestion, there is a circular process which it will be necessary to
analyze precisely
The main result result of this paper is the existence of two "miror"
equilibria. In each equilibria the firm with the larger capacity sets the
higher prices and is less congested than its competitor. Duopolistic
equilibrium then reproduces the properties of the "Paris Metro Pricing"
proposal of Odlyzko: consumer with diﬀerent degrees of aversion to con-
gestion are oﬀered diﬀerent (sub) networks: the more congestion adverse
are allowed to pay more in order to benefit from a lower congestion rate.
2
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1.1 The Model
There exist on the market two I.S.P each choosing a couple (price, qual-
ity), (p1, q1) for firm 1 and (p2, q2) for firm 2. The price is a lump sum
which gives the right to the consumer to connect himself (hersel) to the
network of the ISP during a given period of time. The quality qi of firm
i’s service is supposed equal to the ratio kiDi (
Di
ki being the congestion rate
of firm i’s network) where Ki represents the capacity of firm i’s network
and Di is the demand to firm i ( number of users).. This assumption
is selected for the sake of simplicity. The basic idea is that the users
always prefer a lower rate of congestion because the congestion present
on a network represents a cost (measured in units of time) for the users
since it delays or slows down the sending and the reception of data. This
time increases with the number of connected users and decreases with
the capacity of the network.
Consumers are characterized by their type θ wich measures their
preference for quality (the higher is θ, the more important is the pref-
erence for quality). They subscribe to one of both firms. We make the
simplifying assumption according to which θ is distributed uniformly on
the interval [ 0,1 ]. The surplus of a type θ−consumer suscribing to firm
i may be written as :
Si(θ) = u+ θ qi − pi
3
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where u is a strictly positive parameter, the value of which is sup-
posed very high so that at the equilibrium every user prefers to subscribe
to one of the firms rather than staying out (i.e. the market is always
covered).
T
1. We shall study the perfect sugame Nash equilibria, of the following
three-stage game:
2. in a first stage the ISPs choose in a simultaneous way the capacity
of their respective networks, the firm i investing an amount of
money C(Ki) in order to reach a capacity Ki. The function c is
assumed increasing, convex and such that C(0) = 0. The capacity
choices are irreversible and observable.
3. in a second stage, given the capacities previously selected, the ISPs
choose, who rationally anticipate the equilibrium demand func-
tions Di(p1, p2), i = 1, 2, determined in the third stage, simultane-
ously choose their prices;
4. in the third stage each user chooses the network to which it will be
connected given to the couple of prices (p1, p2) chosen previously
by the ISPs and to the couple of rates of congestion which she/he
is assumed to rationally anticipate.
1.2 The perfect subgame equilibrium
4
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As usual the model is solved backward starting with the last stage, i.e.
the determination of the demand functions. The type θ∗-individual is
indiﬀerent between the two oﬀers. All the consumers of types θ > θ∗
contract with the high quality firm while the consumers of types θ < θ∗
choose the low quality firm.
θ∗q1 − p1 = θ∗q2 − p2 => θ∗ =
p2 − p1
q2−q1
.
The demand addressed to the low quality firm firm is equal to θ∗. The
demand addressed to the high quality firm is equal to (1−θ∗). Straight-
forwardly the demand addressed to each firm depends on the expected
rate of congestion . The realized rate of congestion is itself a function
of the demand. The assumption of rational anticipations imposes an
equality between both expected and realized rates of congestion for each
I.S.P.
Let us first consider the case where firm 2 is the high quality firm
(p2 > p1):
The demand addressed to firm 2 is thus :
D2 = 1−
p2 − p1
q2−q1
(1)
where
q2 =
K2
D2
(2)
5
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In the same way for firm 1
D1 =
p2 − p1
q2−q1
and
q1 =
K1
D1
It follows that the diﬀerence between the "realized" qualities q2−q1
is a function of the diﬀerence between the expected qualities qa2 − qa1 :
q2 − q1 =
K2(qa2 − qa1)
(qa2 − qa1) (p2 − p1)
− K (q
a
2 − qa1)
(p2 − p1)
(3)
Under rational expectations qa2 − qa1 = q2 − q1 and we determine
the equilibrium value of q2 − q1 as a function of both access prices and
networks capacities:
q2 − q1 =
(p2 − p1) [K2 +K1 + p2 − p1]
(p2 − p1) +K1
(4)
In the symmetrical case where p1 > p2 one obtains obviously a sym-
metrical formula
q1 − q2 =
(p1 − p2) [K2 +K1 + p1 − p2]
(p1 − p2) +K2
(5)
When p1 → p2, q1 → q2.
This is the most interesting aspect of the model: a positive diﬀerence
6
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in price generates a diﬀerence in quality so that the most expensive
network is always the least.congested..
By replacing q2− q1 by its equilibrium value one obtains the equilib-
rium demands for p2 > p1:
D2=1−
(K1 + (p2 − p1))
(K1 +K2 + (p2 − p1))
(6)
D1=
(K1 + (p2 − p1))
(K1 +K2 + (p2 − p1))
When p1 > p2 the symmetrical formulas are:
D1=1−
(K2 + (p1 − p2)
(K1 +K2 + (p1 − p2)
(7)
D2=
(K2 + (p1 − p2)
(K1 +K2 + (p1 − p2)
Finally when p2 = p1 we obtain Di = KiK1+K2 , i = 1, 2.
It is now possible to analyze the second stage equilibrium of the game.
There is at this level of the play a Nash equilibrium in price between the
Internet Service Providers. When p2 > p1,the respective profits of both
firms are:
7
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π2= [1−
(K1 + (p2 − p1))
(K1 +K2 + (p2 − p1))
]p2 − C(K2) (8)
π1= [
(K1 + (p2 − p1))
(K1 +K2 + (p2 − p1))
]p1 − C(K1)
We obtains symmetrical formulas for p1 > p2 :
π1= [1−
(K2 + (p1 − p2)
(K1 +K2 + (p1 − p2))
]p1 − C(K1) (9)
π2= [
(K2 + (p1 − p2)
(K1 +K2 + (p1 − p2))
]p2 − C(K2)
When p2 = p1 we obtain πi = KiK1+K2pi − C(Ki).
For the sake of simplicity we shall now assume that C(Ki) = 0.5∗K2i .
Deriving π2with respect to p2 one obtains
∂π2
∂p2
=
K2 (K1 +K2 − p1)
(K1 +K2 − p1 + p2)2
for p2 > p1 (10)
∂π2
∂p2
=
K22 + (p2 − p1)
2 +K1(p1 − 2p2) +K2(K1 − 2p2 + 2p1)
(K1 +K2 − p2 + p1)2
for p1 > p2
Let us notice moreover that, for p1 > p2 we have ∂
2π2
∂p22
=
− 2K1(K1+K2+p1)
(K1+K2−p2+p1)3
< 0.
Lemma 1:
1. The best reply correspondence of firm 2 is:
8
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(i) when K1 ≥ K2 :
p2 = +∞ for every p1 ∈ [0, K2(1 + K2K1 )]
p2 = K1+K2+ p1−
√
K1
√
K1 +K2 + p1 for every p1 ≥ K2(1+ K2K1 )
(ii) when K2 ≥ K1 :
p2 = +∞ for every p1 ∈ [0, K1 +K2)
p2 ∈ [p1,+∞] for p1 = K1 +K2
p2 = p1 for p1 ∈ [K1 +K2,K2(1 + K2K1 )]
p2 = K1+K2+p1−
√
K1
√
K1 +K2 + p1 for every p1 ≥ K2(1+ K2K1 ).
2. The best reply correspondence of firm 1 is as follows:
(i) when K2 ≥ K1 :
p1 = +∞ for every p2 ∈ [0, K1(1 + K1K2 )]
p1 = K1+K2+ p2−
√
K2
√
K1 +K2 + p2 for every p2 ≥ K1(1+ K1K2 )
(ii) when K1 ≥ K2 :
p1 = +∞ for every p2 ∈ [0, K1 +K2)
p1 ∈ [p2,+∞] for p2 = K1 +K2
p1 = p2 for every p2 ∈ [K1 +K2,K1(1 + K1K2 )]
p1 = K1+K2+p2−
√
K2
√
K1 +K2 + p2 for every p2 ≥ K1(1+ K1K2 ).
Lemma 2: For any couple of networks capacities (K1,K2) ∈ <2+
there exists a unique second-stage Nash equilibrium between the Internet
Access Providers which is such that:
(i) ifK2 > K1 then p1 = K1+K2 and p2 = 12
³
K2 +
p
5K22 + 4K1K2
´
(ii) ifK2 < K1 then p2 = K1+K2 and p1 = 12
³
K1 +
p
5K21 + 4K1K2
´
(iii) if K2 = K1 then p1 = p2 = K1 +K2.
9
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Taking into account Lemma 2, the profits of firm 2 are
π2=K2 −
1
2
K22 if K2 ≥ K1 (11)
π2=
(K1 +K2) (
p
K1(5K1 + 4K2)−K1)
K1 +
p
K1(5K1 + 4K2)
− 1
2
K22 if K2 ≤ K1
and symmetrically for firm 1.
Lemma 3:
1. The reaction function of firm 2 is as follows:
(i) K2 = 1 if K1 ≤ K∗ where K∗ ' 0.829
(ii) K2 = f(K1) where f is a decreasing function such asf(0) = 1
(see Figure below1)
2. The reaction function of firm 1 is exactly symmetrical.
Proof: For a given K1 there are two values of K2 corresponding
potentially to a local maximum of the profit π2 : K2 = 1 et K2 =
f(K1). K2 = 1 can be a solution only for K1 ≤ 1 In the same way
K2 = f(K1) can be a solution only for f(K1) ≤ K1, i.e. for K1 lower
than ' 0.666. Consequently for values of K1 ranging between ' 0.666
and 1 it is necessary to compare the profits respectively associated to
1
The precise formula is too long and too complicated to be reproduced. The graph
is plotted using Mathematica.
10
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Figure 1:
K2 = 1 and K2 = f(K1). It results from this (cf Figure below for
illustration) that K2 = 1 is a best reply if and only if K1 is lower than
approximately 0.829. ¥
The Figure below represents, according to K1, the profits obtained
by firm 2 when respectively it chooses K2 = 1 and K2 = f(K1)
It follows from the preceding Lemma that the reaction function of
each firm is discontinuous, constant (capacity equalizes 1) between 0 and
approximately 0.829 then decreasing after 0.829 where the best reply
jumps down from 1 to approximately 0.649. We deduce easily now the
equilibrium of the game.
Proposition 1 There are two perfect subgame equilibria of the model.
These equilibria are symmetrical and such that:
K∗2 = 1, K∗1 ' 0.635909283988116769, p∗1 = 1.63590928398811685,
p∗2 = 1.87328412354767888 (equilibrium 1) and
11
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Figure 2:
K∗1 = 1, K∗2 ' 0.635909283988116769, p∗2 = 1.63590928398811685,
p∗1 = 1.87328412354767888 (equilibrium 2).
Proof: See previous Lemmas.
There is thus at the equilibrium a vertical diﬀerentiation which is es-
tablished in an endogenous way between the Internet Service Providers:
the firm which provides the larger network has the lowest rate of conges-
tion and the highest access price ... It is interesting to notice that the
corresponding equilibrium profits are 0.560435 for the I.S.P providing
the smallest network (thus the most congested) and 0.5 for the I.S.P
providing the largest network (thus the least congested). There is in the
game studied here a first-mover’ advantage: since there are two symmet-
rical equilibria each Provider prefers being the one which provides the
smallest network and makes the highest profit.
12
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